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International Law and Uganda's Involvement in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC)
Phillip Apuuli Kasaija
Introduction"
Since September 1998, Uganda has been engaged in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). There are various reasons that
have been advanced as to why Uganda is in the DRC. These include the
safeguarding of Uganda's security interests on her Western border,
Museveni's desire to become a hegemonic power in the Great Lakes
region, and the desire by the Museveni government to see a change in
leadership in Kinshasa. Finally, it is argued that having helped Kabila
come to power, he no longer had respect for Museveni.
The purpose of this paper is to address the international law
issues that Uganda's engagement in the DRC raises. The paper argues
that on the one hand, the regional politics in the Great Lakes Region
makes Uganda's involvement inevitable. However, we also argue that
under international law while Uganda's involvement can be justified as
lawful, counter-arguments are inclined to its illegality.
I. Background to the Present Uganda Involvement in the DRC
The government of President Yoweri Museveni has
acknowledged that it helped the forces of Laurent Kabila to remove the
government of deposed President Mobutu from power in Zaire (now
called the DRC) in May 1997. The reason for Uganda's support to
Kabila was the fact that the government of Mobutu had failed to stop
rebel forces opposed to Museveni's National Resistance Movement
(NRM) government from using the DRC to attack Uganda. Indeed on the
12th of November 1996, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) attacked
Uganda from the direction of the DRC. Although the Uganda army
repelled the invaders, this gave the Museveni government the excuse to
support the Kabila forces that were then fighting the government of
Mobutu.
When Kabila took over power in the DRC in May 1997,
President Museveni was one of the main guests at his inauguration.
However, relations between Kabila and Museveni turned sour thereafter.
On 27 July 1997, Kabila decided to send the Rwandese troops that had
helped him topple Mobutu back home.t Suffice it to note that, relations
** Lecturer in International Law and Diplomacy in the Department of Political Science and Public
Administration, Makerere University Kampala, Uganda.
I The crisis actually began, when Kabila announced on 14 July 1998 that he was replacing the
Rwanda officer, James Kabare who had acted as his Chief of Staff, with a native Congolese. See
BBC FOCUS ON AFRICA MAG., October-December 1998, at 5.
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between Museveni and Kabila had thawed even before the present
rebellion in the DRC had broken out. This is exemplified by the fact that,
Museveni refused to honor Kabila's invitation to attend anniversary
celebrations that were to mark his first year in power.
As soon as the present rebellion in the DRC broke out, Kabila
immediately announced that his country had been attacked, by the
Ugandan and Rwandan troops. Kabila addressed a press conference and
is quoted to have said that; "it was Kagame and Museveni [who were]
fomenting the rebellion in the DRC.",2 He repeated these accusations
when he addressed the 4 0 9 2nd Meeting of the Security Council. 3
The government of Uganda first denied that it was involved in
the affairs of the DRC. Uganda's Foreign Minister, Eriya Kategaya,
came out with a statement rebutting Kabila's accusations that Uganda
had invaded the DRC.4 It was not until nearly one month after the
breakout of the rebellion in the DRC that, President Museveni defined
Uganda's interests in the DRC.5 However, he did not say whether
Ugandan troops were actually present in the DRC.
It was not until August 26 1998, that Uganda's Foreign Minister,
Eriya Kategaya, told Uganda's Parliament that indeed the Uganda
Peoples Defence Force (UPDF) was actually deployed in the DRC.6 He
explained that, the UPDF was in the DRC to protect the country's
legitimate interests He did not elaborate what these interests were. This
was emphasized by Major General Salim Saleh, then 'Overseer' of the
Ministry of Defence and Presidential Advisor on Defence and Military
Affairs. Major General Saleh was quoted to have intimated that, "Uganda
troops will remain deep in the Congo until Kabila [accepted] a political
solution to the crisis." 8 He further said that, "[they had] evidence that
2 THE NEW VISION, August 7, 1998.

3 United Nations, Security Council 4092nd Meeting, Monday January 24, 2000, p. 11. President
Laurent Desire Kabila was assassinated on 16th January 2001 by one of his bodyguards. He was
succeeded by his son Major General Joseph Kabila. Incidentally while addressing a United Nations
Human Rights Session in Geneva Switzerland, he was quoted as saying that he wanted the
"aggressors" to get out of his country. See THE NEW VISION, Sunday April 1, 2001.
4 Supra note 2.
5 He defined Uganda's security interests in the DRC as; Congo's territory being used by Sudan to
infiltrate terrorists into Uganda; Congo's territory not being used by the Interahamwe to kill people
in Kisoro; together with the international community not allowing genocide to take place; and the
hope that the Congolese people can be democratically empowered after a generation of Mobutuism.
See THE NEW VISION, August 23, 1998.
6 THE NEW VISION, August 26, 1998.

7 Id.
8 THE NEW VISION, August 28, 1998.
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Kabila was arranging to attack [Uganda] on all frontiers." 9 Thus, Uganda
had to move very fast to forestall such an attack.
When Kabila came to power, his government signed a
memorandum of understanding with the Uganda government to the
effect that the UPDF would conduct joint operations with the Congolese
Armed Forces (FAC), to stop the DRC territory from being used by the
Uganda rebels as a launching pad to attack Uganda.1"
It is well known now that some countries were convinced by
Kabila's assertions that it was indeed Uganda and Rwanda that had
invaded his territory. Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and later on Chad
joined on the side of Kabila under the Southern Africa Development
Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security established
in 1996, of which Zimbabwe was holding the Chairmanship at that time.
When Kabila took over power, the DRC joined this regional grouping.
Meanwhile, Uganda and Rwanda got involved on the side of the
Congolese rebels controlling large areas of Eastern Congo. But is foreign
intervention in the DRC especially that of Uganda, lawful under
international law? Before we answer this question, we need to establish
what the different international law instruments say. To this we shall now
turn.

II. An Examination of the International Law Instruments
One of the primary purposes of the UN is, .".. [t]he suppression

This is further
of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace .
expounded in Article 2 (4) of the Charter which says that, "all members
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN." The
central obligation of the Charter law and customary international law is
the prohibition of the use of force, one that finds expression in judicial
decisions of the International court of Justice (ICJ).12 This obligation has

9 Id.
10 In an interview with the New Vision, Uganda's Ambassador to the DRC, Dr. Kamanda
Bataringaya said that, three Memoranda of Understanding had been signed between the DRC and
Uganda. These covered an agreement for joint operations between the UPDF and the FAC; an
agreement between the DRC, Uganda and the UNHCR to repatriate DRC refugees from Kyaka I and
II; and agreement for the Uganda Police to train the DRC Police on handling riots. See THE NEW
VISION September 13, 1998.
11 U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para.1.
12 Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) (1949) ICJ Reports (1949); See also Case Concerning
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Merits) (Nicaragua v USA) (1986)
ICJ p. 6
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also been emphasised in international case law. 3 Article 2 (4) of the
Charter is now regarded as a principle of customary international law,
and as such is binding upon all states of the world community. Similarly,
the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), in re-affirming
the member states obligations in pursuing the purposes of the
Organisation states that "[the member states will] respect the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to
independent existence"'14 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter has been
elaborated upon by different international law instruments. These
include:
The 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in
the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence
and Sovereignty 5 (hereafter called the 1965 Declaration) reinforces
Article 2 (4) by saying that "[n]o state has the right to intervene, directly
or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs
of any other state." It further emphasises that, "[c]onsequently armed
intervention and all other interference or attempted threats against the
personality of the state or against its political, economic and cultural
element are condemned."
The 1965 Declaration was re-affirmed in the 1970 Declaration
on the Principles of International Law 1 6 (hereafter called the 1970
Declaration). This declaration states that, "[w]ars of aggression constitute
a crime against peace for which there is state responsibility under
international law." It further emphatically states among other things that:
"[s]tates must refrain from organising, instigating, assisting and
participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state
and must not encourage the formation of armed bandits for
incursion into another states territory."
These two declarations constitute an important interpretation of the UN
Charter provisions especially Article 2(4).
According to the General Assembly Resolution on the Definition
of Aggression of 1974 (hereafter called The General Assembly
Definition of Aggression), any of the following acts regardless of a
declaration of war shall ... qualify as an act of aggression,
"[t]he invasion or attack by the armed forces of a state of the
territory of another state, or any military occupation however
temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or annexation
by the use of force of the territory of another state or part
17
thereof."
13 Nicaragua v USA (Merits) Case, 1986.
14 THE OAU CHARTER art. 3 para. 2.
15 G.A. Resn. 2131 (XX). December 21, 1965. U.N. G.A.O.R., 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, p.11
16 G.A. Resn. 2625 (XXV), October 24, 1970.
17 See supranote 15 and 16 at Art. 3 (a).
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It further states that aggression is committed, "[by] the sending
by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another state of
such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above or its substantial
involvement therein."1 8
Thus the question we need to answer is whether Uganda's
presence in the DRC is consistent with the principles of international law
as spelled out in these instruments. If this is answered in the negative,
can Uganda justify her presence in the DRC using other customary rules
of international law?
III. The Illegality Debate
Looking at the principles of international law it is correct to say
that the use of force in any form against the territory of another state is
outlawed. Now the issue that we need to address is whether the UPDF's
presence in the DRC constitutes the use of force prohibited by
conventional and customary international law. Kabila has persistently
claimed that the UPDF's presence in the DRC is unwelcome. This means
that by Uganda keeping her troops there, she is committing aggression.
The General Assembly's Definition of Aggression, talks of, "the invasion
by the armed forces of a state or the territory of another state..." Kabila
has contended that the UPDF actually invaded the territory of the DRC.
Further the General Assembly's Definition talks of, .".. any military
occupation..." The Uganda troops are actually occupying a swathe of
territory in Eastern Congo which clearly is an act of aggression.
Even under the 1965 Declaration, the UPDF's occupation would
be considered contrary to international law. Now, Uganda has
persistently claimed that, her troops are in the DRC to forestall attacks on
the personality of Uganda by the ADF rebels. Although, this is not in
conformity with what Major General Saleh stated as Uganda's reason for
going into the DRC as alluded to above. If the 1965 Declaration is
strictly interpreted, the UPDF occupation of DRC territory would be
contrary to international law. This is because, the Declaration talks of."..
armed intervention..." The UPDF went into the Congo well armed to
fight, and as Kabila has persistently stated uninvited. This, no doubt,
constitutes armed intervention in a sovereign state.
International law treats civil wars as purely internal matters. This
position finds expression both in the 1965 and 1970 Declarations. 1 9
18 See id. at Art. 3 (g).
19 The 1965 Declaration states that no state has the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for any
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. Consequently, armed
intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the
state or against its political, economic and cultural elements are condemned. While the 1970
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However of recent, there have arisen reports that Ugandan troops
stationed inside the DRC are assisting the Congolese Rally for
Democracy (RCD) rebels fighting to remove the government of Laurent
Kabila. And further, reports have come up saying that the Uganda
government has helped set up the Congolese Rally for Democracy
(RCD) before it broke into two factions and its troops are fighting
alongside another anti-Kabila group called the Congolese Liberation
Movement (CLM) led by Jean Pierre Bemba. 20 This group is operating in
Northern Congo. Uganda, in supporting the CLM and RCD-Kisangani, is
acting contrary to international law. Article 2(4) of the Charter clearly
use of
forbids states in their relations with other states from, .".. the ...

of any state in any manner
force against the territorial integrity ...
inconsistent with the purposes of the UN Charter." The UPDF fighting
alongside the anti-Kabila forces would clearly indicate that Uganda is
using force against the territory of another state (the DRC). This would
be contrary to Article 2(4) and the other purposes of the UN Charter to
which Uganda is a signatory.
Again, the 1965 Declaration is very succinct. It states that "no
state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly for any reason
affairs of any other state." The UPDF's
whatsoever in the internal ...
participation directly or indirectly in the Congo war, is therefore,
contrary to this Declaration and is against established international law
norms.

The 1970 Declaration would be more appropriate to apply in the
instance that the UPDF is engaged directly in the Congo war. It
emphasises that "states must refrain from organising, instigating,
in another state..." The
assisting or participating in acts of civil strife ...
International Court of Justice, in the Nicaragua(Merits) case, was called
upon to decide whether the support given to the Contras by the United
States constituted intervention by the United States in the internal affairs
of Nicaragua. The court held that "the support given by the USA, up to
the end of 1984 to the military and paramilitary activities of the Contras
in Nicaragua, by financial support, training, supply of weapons,
intelligence and logistical support, constitutes a clear breach of the

Declaration states that every state has the duty to refrain from organising, instigating, assisting,
participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organised
activities within its telTitory directed towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to
in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.
20 BBC Correspondent in Uganda, Anna Borzello was given transport to travel to the CLM's
liberated areas by the Uganda Army (UPDF) and she was told that she might find Jean Pierre
Bemba, the leader of CLM 'interesting'. BBC's Focus ON AFRICA MAGAZINE., Jan-March 1999, at
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principle of non-intervention.", 21 Reports out of the DRC have confirmed
that the UPDF has been training the anti-Kabila forces in the use of arms.
Also, it has been reported that the UPDF has actually participated in
rebel battles against the forces of Kabila.22 As has been emphasised in
international law, there is generally no right of intervention in support of
an opposition within another state.23 These actions by Uganda clearly
constitute "organising, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife in
another state."
The General Assembly's Resolution on the Definition of
Aggression states that aggression is committed, "by the sending by or on
behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, irregulars ...which carry out acts
of armed force against another state... or its substantial involvement
thereof'(emphasis added). The anti-Kabila forces are clearly not
operating from the Ugandan territory, although their leaders come and go
as they please in Uganda. While Uganda has not acknowledged that these
forces are acting on her behalf, the following inference can be drawn:
Uganda is contravening the 1974 General Assembly Resolution. By
actively helping the anti-Kabila forces, Uganda's actions clearly
constitute, .".. the substantial involvement" of Uganda in the affairs of

the DRC.
IV. The Legality Debate
The only justification for the use of force by one state against the
other under the legal regime of the Charter is self-defence or
participation in the United Nations enforcement action. 24 The principle of
non-intervention by one state in the affairs of other states is emphasised
under the UN Charter and doctrine.2" Uganda has persistently said that
her troops are in the DRC to prevent that territory from being used by the
ADF rebels with the support of Sudan to attack Uganda. Based on the
different statements of the Uganda government, it is clear that Uganda
thinks that Kabila was supporting the Uganda rebels. The support by the
Kabila government of the Uganda rebel elements based in the DRC is
contrary to principles of customary international law. All the
21 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Merits paragraph 242).
22 Brigadier James Kazini, the UPDF Acting Chief of Staff admitted that his soldiers helped to fight
the Chadian troops fighting for Kabila. (See BBC'S supra). Also it was reported that it was the
UPDF which did most of the fighting when the town of Buta was captured by the rebels on 5th
October 1998. (Id. at 17).
23 MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 798 (1997). Also this position was re-emphasised by the

ICJ in the Nicaragua (Merits) case when it stated, "no such general right [of intervention for the
benefit of the forces opposed to the government of another state...] exists in international law.
24 U.N. CHARTER art. 51
25 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Merits).
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international law instruments cited above outlaw such kind of actions.
Uganda therefore has the right to take self-defensive measures to
safeguard her territorial sovereignty against Kabila supported rebels.
Until the proliferation of the UN Charter,26 the most authoritative
definition of self-defence is found in the Caroline Case (183 7). That case
says that for a state to claim self-defence, "[ft]here has to exist a necessity
of self defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and
no moment of deliberation." 27 Today, however, customary international
law holds that not only should such conditions exist for self-defence to
be claimed, but also the action taken in pursuance of it must not be
unreasonable or excessive, since the act, justified by the necessity of selfdefence, must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it. The
question then to be asked and answered is: Can Uganda claim selfdefence for her involvement in the DRC?

V. The Self Defence Claim
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua v USA
(Merits) case clearly established that the right of self-defence exists as an
inherent right under customary international law, as well as under the
United Nations Charter. 28 However, the ICJ also confirmed that action
taken as self-defence remains subject to the Caroline requirements of
necessity and proportionality. The clearest rationalisation, to-date, as to
why Uganda got entangled in the DRC was spelled out in detail by the
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in charge of Regional Co-operation,
Amama Mbabazi, while addressing the 5 3rd General Assembly Session of
the UN in New York. The reasons for Uganda's involvement in the DRC
were presented in terms of both external and internal dimensions. The
external dimensions were spelled out as: attacks by ADF rebels on
Uganda from the DRC, from the Mobutu regime through to the present
Kabila regime, necessitating self-defence and hot pursuit by Uganda into
the DRC; an understanding between the Kabila regime and the Ugandan
regime to collaborate in the task of flushing out of Ugandan rebels from
the DRC; collusion between the DRC and the Khartoum regime to
provide operational bases and material support to the rebels in the DRC,
as well as to avail to the Khartoum regime the use of the DRC territory as
a launching pad for attacks on Uganda; and the (unexpected) involvement
of other new actors (Namibia, Angola, Zimbabwe and Chad) which acted
as a catalyst to increase the level of Uganda's own intervention.
The internal dimensions were spelled out as: the breakout of the
rebellion of August 2, 1998 in the DRC, arising from the alienation of
26 Article 51 of the UN Charter talks about the [inherent] right of self defence and collective self

defence, but the term self defence or what constitutes self defence is not defined.
27 R.Y. Jennings, The Carolineand McLeod Cases, 32 A.J.I.L 82, 89 (1938).

28 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Merits).
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Congolese political actors excluded from the narrowly-based and
sectarian regime established by Kabila after his ascent to power in 1997;
the imminent threat of another genocide in the region, arising from
Kabila's open support to the Rwandese Interahamwe and ex-FAR or
Rwandese soldiers of the late Habyarimana regime on the territory of the
DRC; Uganda's obligation (which should, incidentally, be the obligation
of the rest of the international community, as well) to stop this
threatening crime against humanity; and the need to look at the idea of
the sacro-sanctity of national sovereignty and of territorial borders more
critically in circumstances involving such grave threats to human life as
those prevailing in the DRC and in the Sudan. These reasons stated the
Minister, formed the basis of Uganda's intervention in the DRC.
As already noted above, indeed Uganda rebels have been very
active on the Uganda-DRC border. Time and again the rebels have
attacked Uganda from the direction of the DRC. The most prominent
attack occurred on the 12"' of November 1996, when a group of Uganda
rebels calling themselves ADF attacked and overran several small towns
on the Uganda-DRC border. Uganda was therefore a victim of an armed
attack. It took the entire mobilisation of the UPDF to expel the invaders.
The ICJ in the Nicaragua (Merits) case considered what constitutes an
armed attack. The ICJ held that,
"...it may be considered to be agreed that an armed attack must
be understood as including not merely action by regular armed
forces across an international border, but also the sending by or
on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries which carry out acts of armed force against another
state of such gravity as to amount to inter alia an actual armed
attack conducted by regular forces or its substantial involvement
therein."29
As already noted, the Uganda government believed that the ADF
was actively being supported by the Kabila government.30 Therefore, the
Minister's imperative of stopping these rebels from attacking Uganda
would justify Uganda's stationing her troops in the DRC. This is clearly
within the parameters of self defence allowed under international norms.
Suffice it to note that the DRC was acting contrary to international norms
in the first place by allowing her territory to be used by these rebels.
The other imperative of stopping genocide in the DRC would not
fall under self-defence but rather under humanitarian intervention. It
should be noted that the other imperatives for intervention as advanced
by the Minister, however novel or noble they are, would be contrary to
291d. at 195.
30 For example in his address to Parliament President Museveni said, "even when the Rwandese
were still there, the Congolese Army would cohabit peacefully with those who were terrorising us,
saying" Hi siyo vita yetu (That is not our war). See THE NEW VISION, Sept. 17, 1998.
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international law. The internal political arrangements of a country,
however unpalatable to other countries, would not lead to intervention by
other states. If this happens, then this would be interference in the
internal affairs of that country which is contrary to established norms of
customary international law. Internal political arrangements can
precipitate intervention by other states only if they give rise to genocide,
ethnic cleansing, and general abuse of human rights of large sections of
the population. This intervention would then be rightfully undertaken in
the name of humanitarianism. To this possibility we shall now turn.
VI. Humanitarian Intervention?
Among the reasons advanced by Amama Mbabazi for Uganda's
intervention in the DRC was the issue of forestalling genocide from
taking place in the DRC. One of the reasons why the rebellion against
Mobutu was started in 1996 by Kabila, was the fact that the Mobutu
government had asked the Banyamulenge, an ethnic group living in
Congo related to the Tustsis of Rwanda, to leave the DRC. There were
well founded fears that genocide would arise because the government of
Kabila was helping the ex FAR and Interahamwe who were the main
perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. In this genocide, up to one
million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed by extremist Hutus. When
the Rwandese Patriotic Force/Army (RPF/A) took over power in Kigali
after the genocide, the ex-Far and Interahamwe forces ran into exile in
the DRC. From that time, they have started organising for their return to
power in Kigali.
Humanitarian intervention has been a controversial issue in
international law.31 Major questions have related to the circumstances
under which humanitarian intervention is accepted in international law.
How does one tally humanitarian intervention with the doctrine of state
sovereignty? A number of international law scholars have attempted to
answer these questions. 32 However, recent cases in international system
have given insight as to what humanitarian intervention is all about.

31 For example, Ian Brownlie has observed that unilateral action by a state in the territory of another
state on the ground that human rights require protection or a threat of force against a state for this
reason is unlawful. Whereas the United Kingdom view is that when a state commits cruelties against
and persecution of its nationals in such a way as to deny their fundamental human rights and to
shock the conscience of mankind, intervention in the interest of humanity is legally permissible. (See
U.K. Foreign Office Policy, Doe. 48, at 11-20.).
32 For example Christopher Greenwood has cited the examples of India's intervention in East
Bengal in 1971, Tanzania's overthrow of the Amin government in Uganda in 1979, and Vietnam's
use of force against Pol Pot's regime in Cambodia in 1979. In all these cases the countries
intervening, pleaded self-defence.

2001-2002

UGANDA'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE DROC

85

For a long time, international law held that no intervention in the
internal affairs of another state was allowed whatsoever even by the
United Nations itself.33 Intervention by one state in another state's affairs
was allowed only when that other state was exercising its right of selfdefence. However, recent events have shown that humanitarian
intervention can be pled when particular circumstances are taking place
within a country. In support of humanitarian intervention, former United
Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar observed,"[w]e are
witnessing what is probably the most irreversible shift in public attitudes
towards the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of
morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents. 34
International interventions in the Former Yugoslavia (Kosovo in
particular) and Iraq, among others, was done in the name of humanitarian
intervention. Thus, the position of De Cuellar was vindicated. After the
end of the Gulf War in 1991, there was an uprising by the Kurdish and
Shiite populations of Iraq. President Saddam Hussein of Iraq, who had
just lost the war, decided to vent his anger on the Kurds and Shiite
Muslims. The entire Kurdish population living in the North of Iraq was
sent into the mountains bordering Turkey. In response, the Security
Council of the UN adopted Resolution 688 on April 5, 1991. The
Resolution among other things insisted that Iraq "allow immediate access
by the international humanitarian organisations to all those in need of
assistance in all parts of Iraq." This Resolution, as one scholar has put it,
"broke new ground in the degree to which it involved the Security
Council in taking a stand against a state's ill-treatment of its own
people. 35 Resolution 688 contained no provision regarding the
enforcement of the resolution either by the UN or by individual member
states.36 However, the USA, UK and others decided, among other things,
to impose no-fly zones over Northern and Southern Iraq. No Iraqi planes
are allowed to fly over these designated zones.
On top of the no-fly zones declaration, the Western powers
provided humanitarian assistance to the Kurds and Shiites. All this was
done in the name of humanitarian intervention. The Security Council
could not sit by and see the human rights of a large number of people
being trampled upon by a dictator. Up to now, the no-fly zones are still in
place over Northern and Southern Iraq. Therefore, the sovereignty of Iraq
and the provisions of the UN Charter were overridden by the
humanitarian imperative.
33 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para 7.
34 Christopher Greenwood, Is There a Right of Humanitarian Intervention? THE WORLD
TODAY, Feb.1993, at 35.
351d. at 36.
36 Id.
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When the majority Kosovo Albanians rose up in the province of
Kosovo in the former Yugoslavia for greater autonomy, the government
of Yugoslavia under Slobodan Milosevic decided to use force to curb the
unrest. Whole populations of Kosovar Albanians were expelled from
their homes and men of fighting age were arrested and killed by the
Serbs. The international community first reacted by calling and
organising peace talks between the Yugoslav authorities and the Kosovar
Albanians. When an agreement was reached at Rambouillet France, the
Kosovo Albanians signed but the Yugoslav authorities refused to sign.
When the ethnic cleansing of the Kosovars by the Serbs continued in
Kosovo, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) decided to
act.37 It launched air strikes on Yugoslavia, until the Yugoslav authorities
accepted the international community terms. Currently, the province of
Kosovo is under NATO control and the expelled Kosovars are returning
to their villages. All this was done in the name of humanitarian
intervention. NATO did not have to go to the Security Council of the UN
to ask for permission to start bombing Yugoslavia.
Thus, from the above two examples, it can be deduced that today
under international law, humanitarian intervention in another state's
internal affairs by the international community is permitted. One
commentator has put it that, "the Nuremberg norm prohibiting genocide
'trumps' the Westphalian norm of non-intervention., 38 Thus, Uganda
claiming to have gone into the DRC to forestall genocide from taking
place there (which was a real possibility given the presence of the
Interahamwe) would not be contrary to international law. Genocide is an
act that gives rise to erga omnes obligations owed to all states, and which
all states are under an obligation to stop from occurring. Already, the
international community failed to intervene in Rwanda and stop the 1994
genocide from occurring.
Conclusion
There have been multifarious debates all trying to explain the
legality and illegality in international law of Uganda's involvement in the
DRC. The treatment above has attempted to explain within the bounds of
international law instruments the legality and illegality of Uganda's
involvement. The politics of the Great Lakes Region and the internal
politics of Uganda required that Uganda get involved in the DRC. The
only arguable point is the extent of Uganda's involvement. Does a
country need to occupy a quarter of another country's territory to protect
37 Although, it has to be noted that there was no specific Security Council Resolution authorising
NATO to use force. In this regard therefore it may be argued that NATO's use of force against
Yugoslavia was illegal under international law.
38 Kenneth Campbell, The Role of Force in HumanitarianIntervention, at http://www.usafa.mil
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her borders against rebel incursion? Suffice it to note that Article 2(4) of
the United Nations Charter emphasises territorial integrity of states.
This paper has shown that there are undisputed reasons that are
clearly within international law bounds that Uganda has advanced to be
engaged in the DRC. Indeed, no country should sit idly-by and leave
genocide to take place in another country simply because of respect of
the sovereignty of another country. The costs of inaction are far greater
than intervention. This was clearly shown by the 1994 genocide in
Rwanda. However, there are other activities that Uganda has engaged in
that are clearly illegal under international law. The training and arming
of DRC insurgents and the actual participation in military operations
against the DRC army are clear violations.
Also, the reported rapacious looting of the DRC natural
resources by the Ugandan army and civilian individuals is clearly not
within the bounds of international law. Despite persistent denials that
Uganda is not exploiting DRC wealth, evidence has come up pointing to
the contrary. Professor Wamba dia Wamba one of the rebel leaders in
Congo in an interview with a Danish newspaper Aktuelt confirmed that
the armies of Uganda and Rwanda were behind extensive looting of
Congo's natural resources. He said, "[I]n the case of Rwanda it is a state
policy. In the case of Uganda it is individuals., 39 He confirmed that
several high-ranking Ugandan officers organise looting of Congo's vast
natural resources such as gold, precious stones and timber. Also, a

39 Gunnar willum, Rebel Leader Confirms What Western DonorsDeny: Uganda PlundersCongo, 2
(Jan.22, 2001),

at http://www.willum.com/articles/aktuelt22jan20O1/index.htm,
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United Nations Panel 40 probing illegal exploitation of Congo's natural
resources named among other countries Uganda, as being one of the
looters of Congo's wealth. The Panel's report41 noted that although
Uganda as country had no policy to loot Congo, "several Uganda Peoples
Defence Force (UPDF) officers, former Presidential Advisor on Defence
and Security Affairs, as well as political heavy weights [were implicated
in the looting]. 42

40 By the President statement of 2 June 200 (S/PRST/2000/20), the Security Council requested the
Secretary General to establish this expert panel for a period of six months. The Secretary General in
a letter to the President of the Security Council of 31 July 2000 (S/2000/76) notified the President of
the Security Council the composition of the panel as follows: Madame Safiatou Ba-N'Daw (Cote
d'Voire-Chairperson); Mr Francois Ekoku-Cameroon; Mr. Mel Holt-United Satates; Mr. Henri
Maire-Switzerland; and Mr. Moustapha Tall-Senegal.
41 The report is titled, "Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo."
42 See Uganda, Rwanda Officers Cited in DR Congo Looting, THE NEW VISION, Mar. 28, 2001.

